State of Utah v. John Quas : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. John Quas : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Judith S.H. Atherton; Assistand Attorney General; Attorneys
for Appellee.
Elizabeth Holbrook; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Quas, No. 890601 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2240
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
5**-
••.gTNQ, w& THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890601-CA 
v. : 
JOHN QUAS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF MURDER IN THE 
SECOND DEGREE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
1989), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S. H. ATHERTON (3982) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
F I L E 
JUN 2 61990 
CUH k a? tm Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN QUAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
: Case No. 890601-CA 
Category No. 2 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S. H. ATHERTON (3982) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF MURDER IN THE 
SECOND DEGREE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
1989), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, PRESIDING. 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT IT 
DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE 
CIRCUIT COURT'S DECISION TO BIND THIS CASE 
OVER FOR TRIAL 11 
POINT II BY FAILING TO TIMELY APPEAL THE BINDOVER 
ORDER, DEFENDANT HAS FORFEITED HIS RIGHT 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 12 
POINT III THE STATE MET THE BRICKEY STANDARD FOR 
REFILING AN INFORMATION 13 
POINT IV THE TESTIMONIES OF DR. TODD GREY AND BRENT 
MARCHANT WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED AND DID 
NOT VIOLATE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 702, 
404 and 403 25 
POINT V THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS THAT 
DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY WHEN THE 
STATEMENT WERE MADE 29 
POINT VI TESTIMONY CONCERNING SUSAN QUAS'S STATE 
OF MIND PRIOR TO HER DEATH WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED 39 
POINT VII THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED "FLIGHT" JURY INSTRUCTION 
AND PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
REASONABLE DOUBT 42 
CONCLUSION 49 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) 32, 37 
Berrynill v. State, 568 P.2d 1306 Okla. Crim. App. 
1977) 16 
California v. Behler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) 33, 37 
Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). 15 
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) 45 
Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. 1971)... 15-16 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) 38 
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).. 14-15 
Matricia v. State, 726 P.2d 900 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1986) 16 
Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990) 38 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) 38 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 32-33, 38 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) 38 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) 33, 37 
Salt Lake City v. earner 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) 34, 37 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980) 16 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 32 
State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988) 39-42 
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 38 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) passim 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989) 10 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983) 32 
-ii-
State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943) 37 
State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502 (Utah 1986) 43 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 
110 S. Ct. 62 (1989) 2, 26, 29, 31 
State v. Gallegos, 716 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985) 32 
State v. Gordon, No. 890130-CA (Utah Ct. App. June 14, 
1990) 12 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986) 46 
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974). 45 
State v. Humphrey, No. 890424-CA (Utah Ct. App. June 
14, 1990) 12 
State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982) 38-39 
State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989) 45, 47-48 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981) 1, 13 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah May 4, 1989).. 2, 32, 37 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 44-45, 47-48 
State v. Kish, 28 Utah 2d 430, 503 P.2d 1208 (1972)... 38 
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1985) 3, 44 
State v. Maynard, 596 P.2d 893 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) 
16 
State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 1986) 38 
State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 281, 495 P.2d 808 (1972). 43. 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986) 28 
State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985) 2 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 13 
State v. Shuman, 639 P.2d 155 (Utah 1981) 34, 37 
State v. Tillman 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 47 
State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977) 39-40, 42 
-iii-
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) 1, 3, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989) (previously 
S 77-35-26(b)(3) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1989) 1, 12 
Utah R. of App. P. 5(a) 13 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) 39 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) 26, 39 
Utah R. Evid. 403 10, 25-26, 
28-29, 39 
Utah R. Evid. 404 10, 25-26, 28 
Utah R. Evid. 702 10, 25-26, 28 
Utah R. Evid. 703 20, 27, 29 
Utah R. Evid. 803(3) 39-40 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. Rules of Evid. 615 10 
-iv-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN QUAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890601-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of murder in the 
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the district court have jurisdiction to review the 
circuit court's decision to bind over defendant for trial, and, 
by failing to timely appeal the bindover order through 
interlocutory appeal, did defendant forfeit his right to appeal? 
Out-of-time appeals must be dismissed. State v. Johnson, 635 
P.2d 36 (Utah 1981) . 
Did the State meet the standard for refiling a criminal 
information? Since this determination by the magistrate is 
highly fact-sensitive and relies on the accumulation of evidence 
presented at two preliminary hearing, the magistrate's ruling 
should be afforded a high degree of deference. See generally 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). 
Were the testimonies of experts properly admitted under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence? No contemporaneous objection was 
made to their admission, and defendant as waived his right to 
raise the matter on appeal. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35-
55 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). In the absence of 
proper objections, this Court may determine whether the trial 
court committed "plain error." The standard to assess whether 
"plain error" exists is two-part. The error must be obvious from 
an examination of the record and harmful. I_d. at 35. 
Did the trial court properly admit evidence of 
defendant statements? In reviewing a trial court's evidentiary 
ruling, an appellate court will not disturb a factual finding in 
the absence of clear error, and a legal conclusion will be given 
no deference but reviewed under a correction of error standard. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah May 4, 1989). 
Was testimony concerning the victim's state of mind 
properly admitted? The trial court's ruling on admissibility of 
evidence will not be reversed absent a showing that the trial 
court so abused its discretion as to create a likelihood that 
injustice resulted. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985). 
Did the trial court properly reject defendant's 
requested "flight" jury instruction and properly instruct the 
jury on the standard of reasonable doubt? No prejudicial error 
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occurs if it appears that the giving or rejection of a requested 
instruction would not have affected the outcome of the trial. 
State v, McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant statutory text is attached hereto as 
Appendix A, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1989) (R. 3). That charge was dismissed at the 
preliminary hearing to determine whether defendant should be 
bound over to stand trial on the charges. The State refiled the 
charge, and, after the second preliminary hearing, defendant was 
bound over for trial. 
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder after a 
jury trial (R. 589). Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 
five years to life at the Utah State Prison with an additional 
term of one to five years for use of a firearm, to be served 
consecutively with the other term (R. 600-01). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
At 9:41 p.m. on June 15, 1987, the Salt Lake County 911 
operator received a phone call from defendant stating that his 
wife, Susan Quas, had shot herself (T. 199; State's exhibits 1 & 
Although defendant never specifically raises a sufficiency of 
evidence issue on appeal, his brief contains representations of 
the facts of the case and inferences that he draws from those 
representations. Consequently, the State is including a more 
thorough, though still abbreviated, statement of the facts of the 
case than would normally be warranted by the appellate issues as 
framed by defendant. 
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2). The first police officer and paramedics arrived at 
defendant's residence within four minutes of defendant's call (T. 
236, 319). They found Susan Quas lying on some sheets in the 
living room of the house, dead of a gunshot wound to her left eye 
(T. 238-39). 
Defendant said he had been in the shower, had heard a 
gunshot, had come out of the shower and found his wife lying on 
the living room floor (T. 241, 287-88, 338). He said he then 
picked up the gun lying next to his wife, put it back down and 
immediately called 911 (T. 376). He stated that he had been in 
the shower for four to five minutes, had washed his hair and was 
half shaven at the time he heard the shot (T. 376). He was 
wearing a robe but did not appear to the investigating officers 
or the paramedic to be wet. His hair was splashed with water on 
top but was not wet to the roots and appeared unwashed and messy 
(T. 241, 288, 324, 339, 377). His hands were extremely dirty (T. 
339, 377). His face was not halfway shaven (T. 377). His robe 
and feet were dry, and there was no water on the plastic carpet 
runner leading to the bathroom where defendant stood (T. 324, 
339) . 
The bathroom floor and the shower areas in the bathtub 
were dry when checked at approximately 10:05 p.m. (T. 340). 
Detective Ronald T. Edwards thoroughly check€*d the shower and 
bathroom again at approximately 11:00 p.m. He noticed that the 
towels in the bathroom were dry; the sink, tub and soap dish were 
dry; there were no water spills on the floor and there were no 
drops of water or moisture on the glass doors of the tub (T. 
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381). Subsequently Detective Edwards ran several tests on the 
shower by turning it on for three to four minutes and checking it 
periodically thereafter for dryness. In those tests the shower 
was wet up to 95 minutes after the water was shut off (T. 427-
30). Detective Edwards also went down to the basement the night 
of Susan Quas' death and discovered that the pilot light on the 
water heater was off and that the heater had a note on it 
indicating that the tank was empty (T. 383). 
When Officer Edward Spann went to the basement, he 
found the washing machine running and turned it off (T. 34). 
Defendant stated to one officer that he was washing clothes for a 
trip his wife and he were going to take to Tonopah, Nevada and 
that he had needed to wash some pants and shirts for his suit (T. 
341-42, 384, 374). He told Detective Edwards a short time later 
that his wife and he had been arguing and that he had decided to 
leave for two weeks and go to Tonopah (T. 375). Seven of the 
thirteen items in the washer were towels, the other items 
included a half-ripped t-shirt, another t-shirt, a blue shirt, 
sweat pants, briefs and shorts (T. 386). There were no shirts or 
pants that would normally go with a suit (T. 307, 471). 
A low velocity fresh blood splatter was found on the 
carpet runner going downstairs toward the washer and dryer (T. 
409). When analyzed the blood was found to be type A, the same 
as Susan Quas (T. 625-26). Defendant's blood type is B (T. 649) 
Detective Edwards administered a gunshot residue test 
(GSR) to defendant (T. 387). That test is used to determine 
whether particles of lead, antimony or barium, which can be 
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discharged at the time a gun is fired are present on a person's 
hands. As he did so defendant stated that he had been 
2 
fertilizing his lawn all day long (T. 391). Detective Edwards 
checked the garage and found a fertilizer spreader with an opened 
bag of fertilizer covered with debris. Another opened and half-
gone bag was found along with an unopened bag. The fertilizer in 
the opened bags was crusted over and appeared not to have been 
used for months (T. 391-92). Lawn samples were taken from the 
front and back yards along with samples of the fertilizer in each 
bag (T. 393-95). An analysis of the lawn samples revealed no 
fertilizer (T. 618-19). 
About an hour and a half after the arrival of the 
police defendant indicated that he wanted to leave his residence, 
and Officer Lamont Cox took him to the West Valley City Police 
Station (T. 243). At approximately 1:20 a.rru on June 16, 
Detective Edwards interviewed defendant at the police station 
concerning the accounts of the evening (T. 377-78). The 
interview lasted approximately 30 minutes, and Detective Edwards 
returned thereafter to defendant's residence for further 
investigation. At 6:30 a.m. on June 16, defendant was arrested 
(T. 378). 
Defendant was bound over to the district court to be 
3 
tried on the charge of second degree murder. At trial several 
See note 9, infra. 
3 
The procedural history and relevant facts concerning the 
preliminary hearing phase of this case are provided in Point I, 
infra. Because of the nature of preliminary hearing issues, some 
factual information is repeated there. 
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witnesses testified to varying accounts defendant gave them 
concerning the events surrounding his wife's death. Defendant 
told Kristine Knudson, who had moved in with him after his wife's 
death, three different versions. First, he told her he was in 
the shower, heard a shot, came out, and could not tell where his 
wife had been shot, so he picked up her head and put a sheet 
under it (T. 498). In another version he said he was in the 
shower, heard a shot, came out and knew she was already dead (T. 
499). In another, he said he was in the shower, heard a shot, 
came out and walked downstairs to check the wash because he was 
packing to leave (T. 499-500). Defendant told Sherrie Mayer, 
with whom he also lived after his wife's death, that his wife and 
he had been fighting, that he went to pack to leave and that she 
took a gun and shot herself (T. 515-16). In another version, 
defendant said he was in the shower, heard a gunshot, ran out and 
found her lying dead on the floor. He said he then took her 
pulse, picked up her head and put a sheet under it (T. 517). In 
another, defendant said that his wife had been standing with her 
thumbs on the trigger, that the gun went off and she fell in slow 
motion (T. 518). Tapes of his 911 telephone call reveal pleas 
from defendant for the police and paramedics to please hurry, to 
do something to save her (State's exhibits 2 and 3). 
Defendant testified at trial to another version of the 
events. He stated that Susan and he had been arguing, that he 
decided to leave, that he went downstairs put the clothes he 
needed for the drive in the washer and came upstairs to find his 
wife playing with the gun. He testified that he went into the 
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shower for two to three seconds, heard the shot, came out, knelt 
down and picked up the gun and put it down on Susan's stomach. 
He said he then stood up and immediately called the police (T. 
824-28)-
However, testimonies of two neighbors, Thomas Wassmer, 
and Pam Young, gave different accounts of the time between the 
gunshot and the arrival of the paramedics and police. Mr. 
Wassmer saw and heard defendant and his wife arguing on their 
back deck and saw them go into the house. Fifteen or 20 minutes 
later he heard a gunshot and in another 20 minutes heard sirens 
(T. 208-11). Ms. Young, defendant's next-door neighbor, had gone 
for a walk and was sitting on her front porch when the police 
arrived. She had been there for 15 to 20 minutes before their 
arrival and had heard no gunshot (T. 220-21). The paramedics who 
responded to defendant's call estimated that Susan Quas had been 
dead a minimum of 10 to 15 minutes and a maximum of 30 minutes 
(T. 322-23). As noted supra, paramedics and police arrived 
within four minutes of defendant's 911 call. 
At trial defendant also testified in detail concerning 
the events of the whole day of his wife's death, including an 
account of taking her to work at 4:00 a.m., picking her up at 
3:30 - 4:00 p.m., stopping at the liquor store and test driving 
two pick-up trucks (T. 817-22). Testimony of his wife's 
supervisor at work indicated that Susan Quas" had been on 
vacation the day of her death (T. 870-71). Defendant had 
previously told Detective Edwards that his wife had started her 
vacation the day of her death (T. 889). 
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Dr. Todd Grey, the Asstistant State Medical Examiner 
who did the autopsy, concluded that the manner of death was 
homicide (T. 690). His conclusion was based on many factors he 
observed during his investigation. He found the location of the 
wound, in the eye, and the fact the weapon was held 16 to 18 
inches from the wound to be atypical of suicide (T. 676, 688-89). 
He also considered Susan Quas' negative GSR result (T. 684), the 
pattern of stippling (fragments of burned and unburned gunpowder) 
on her face (T. 663, 675-76), the absence of "high velocity" 
blood spattering, gunpowder soot or other debris on her hands 
also to be atypical of suicide (T. 665-66, 678). 
James Gaskill, director of the Weber State College 
Crime Laboratory, analyzed Susan Quas' GSR test, administered GSR 
tests on 25 other people who fired the gun that killed Susan 
Quas, analyzed test firing stippling patterns, studied a 
photograph of the gun firing and conferred with Dr. Grey (T. 545, 
548, 611). He concluded that it was "very unlikely that [Susan 
Quas] fired the gun" (T. 612). 
After the close of the evidence, the jury returned a 
guilty verdict. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court below correctly decided that it did not have 
jurisdiction to review the circuit court's decision to bind this 
case over for trial. 
By failing to timely appeal the bindover order, 
defendant has forfeited his right of appellate review. 
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The State met the Brickey standard for refiling an 
information. 
The testimonies of Dr. Todd Grey and Brent Marchant 
were properly admitted and did not violate Utah Rules of Evidence 
702, 404 and 403. 
The trial court properly admitted the evidence of 
defendant's statements that defendant challenges on appeal 
because defendant was not in custody when the statment was made.. 
Testimony concerning Susan Quas's state of mind prior 
to her death was properly admitted. 
The trial court properly rejected to defendant's 
requested "flight" jury instruction and properly instructed the 
4 jury on reasonable doubt. 
Defendant attempts to raise six appellate issues. However, his 
brief is sprinkled with several complaints about law enforcement, 
the prosecution, and the trial court that not only fail to frame 
appeal issues but also are unfounded as incomplete or distorted 
renditions of the record and often lacking in legal analysis. 
Cases are cited that have no application to the record. See Br. 
of App. n.25 and supplement. 
Indeed, this Court's review of the record will disclose 
substantial hard work and professionalism in preparing this case, 
not an "alchemic" process suggested by defendant. For example, 
contrary to defendant's assertion (Br. of App. n.25), a review of 
Sgt. Spann's testimony at the preliminary heciring and trial 
reveals no material differences. Even if Sgt. Spann testified in 
greater detail at trial, the defense not only had access to his 
police report before the preliminary hearing but also had ample 
opportunity to cross examine him then. Defendant's suggestion of 
surprise is overreaching, and there was no objection at trial. 
Moreover, with respect to Detective Edwards, the record shows 
absolutely no inappropriate treatment of any witness, and had a 
good faith reasonable basis for any questions asked. It is well 
settled that the exclusionary rule for witnesses accommodates the 
special responsibilities of the principal investigating officer, 
see, e.g., Advisory Committee Note, Fed. Rules of Evid. 615 
(adopted verbatim in Utah); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 892 
n.20 (Utah 1989). Judge Rigtrup so recognized. The reckless 
innuendo pervading defendant's brief rings hollow in light of the 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT IT DID 
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE CIRCUIT 
COURT'S DECISION TO BIND THIS CASE OVER FOR 
TRIAL. 
A. Procedural History 
On June 16, 1987, defendant was charged with murder in 
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1989) (R. 3). The preliminary hearing to determine 
whether defendant would be bound over to stand trial on the 
charge was held on June 23 and 31, 1987, before Judge Eleanor Van 
Sciver, in the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County. On August 
3, 1987 the case was dismissed because of insufficient evidence 
(R. 3). On July 5, 1988, the information charging defendant with 
murder in the second degree was refiled (R. 255-57) based on and 
additional evidence. A second preliminary hearing was held on 
October 21, 1988, before Judge Van Sciver. On October 24, 1988, 
defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial District Court to 
stand trial as charged. Defendant filed a motion to quash the 
bindover order in the district court on November 17, 1988 (R. 
268). The State filed a motion to strike defendant's motion to 
quash the bindover on December 19, 1988 (R. 285). On January 6, 
1989, the trial court granted the State's motion on the ground 
Cont. responsible and meticulous manner in which the State 
prepared and presented this case. 
The State has elected to address the appeal questions 
specifically raised and adds this note to advise the Court that 
there is no State concession to the accuracy or validity of the 
random and gratuitous assertions in defendant's brief. 
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that it lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing (R. 327). On January 26, 
1989, defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal from 
the January 6, 1989 interlocutory order of the district court 
with the Utah Supreme Court. That Court denied defendant's 
petition on February 10, 1989. 
B. The District Court Lacks Jurisdiction 
To Review The Bindover Order of the 
Circuit Court. 
Defendant argues that the district court has 
jurisdiction to review the evidentiary sufficiency of bindover 
orders of the circuit court. That precise legal issue recently 
has been addressed by this Court in State v. Humphrey, No. 
890424-CA, State v. Gordon, No. 890130-CA (Utah Ct. App. June 14, 
1990). There, this Court ruled that the district court lacks 
jurisdiction to review bindover orders from the circuit court. 
That ruling specifically disposes of defendant's jurisdiction 
argument. 
POINT II 
BY FAILING TO TIMELY APPEAL THE BINDOVER 
ORDER, DEFENDANT HAS FORFEITED HIS RIGHT OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW. 
The Utah Supreme Court is exclusively vested with 
jurisdiction to review "interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1989). If the defendant 
wished review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing, he should have filed a timely interlocutory 
appeal from the circuit court order with the Utah Supreme Court. 
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State v. Schreuder, 712 P,2d 264, 270 (Utah 1985)- As the 
Supreme Court held in Schreuder, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(c) 
(Supp. 1989) (previously § 77-35-26(b)(3)) governs appeals from 
bindover orders of circuit courts and grants a defendant the 
right to petition for an interlocutory appeal from the order. 
Rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Supp. 1989), 
mandates that such an appeal be taken within 20 days after the 
entry of the order. Defendant, in filing a motion to quash the 
bindover in the district court, forfeited his right to appeal the 
order through proper channels by failing to timely file the 
interlocutory appeal. See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 
(Utah 1981) ("The . . . period for filing a notice of appeal . . 
. is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this Court. Out-
of-time appeals must be dismissed."). 
Therefore, it is now improper for defendant to raise 
any issues concerning the bindover order, and this Court should 
decline to entertain such arguments. 
POINT III 
THE STATE MET THE BRICKEY STANDARD FOR 
REFILING AN INFORMATION. 
This Court should not review substantively the circuit 
court's analysis of the adequacy of the evidence presented at the 
second preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, a review of the 
standard for protection of defendant's due process rights in the 
refiling of criminal charges, as articulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), will 
illustrate that the State produced much more than the quantum of 
evidence necessary to meet that standard. 
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Defendant urges this Court to adopt a position that 
would require the prosecutor to refile an information only if 
there is evidence "not reasonably available at the first 
preliminary hearing" (Br. of App. at 21). Though never 
specifically stated, the clear implication throughout defendant's 
argument is that any evidence that conceivably could have been 
obtained at the time of the first preliminary hearing should not 
be used to assess whether the prosecution has met the Brickey 
standard. In essence, defendant seeks to create a new procedural 
due process right for defendants where prosecutors are barred 
from refiling a charge unless new evidence "jumps out of the 
bushes." The magistrate specifically rejected such a strict 
requirement at the second preliminary hearing, and the governing 
legal authority has not imposed such a burden (PH2. 147, 151). 
"[D]ue process considerations prohibit a prosecutor 
from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient 
evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause 
justified refiling." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. In addition, 
"the prosecutor must, whenever possible, refile the charges 
before the same magistrate, who . . . . [will] not consider the 
matter de novo . . . ." The Court characterized these 
requirements as a "relatively small burden." The State met both 
of these tests in the instant case. The Court in Brickey was 
guided by Oklahoma courts, particularly Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 
169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). There, charges were dismissed 
against the defendant at his first preliminary hearing. The case 
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was refiled, this time before a new magistrate, and the same 
evidence from the first preliminary hearing was offered. After 
the second hearing, the defendant was bound over. The Oklahoma 
court found this procedure to be improper and criticized the 
practice of magistrate "shopping", stating that the State must, 
if possible, refile before the same magistrate and offer 
"additional evidence or prove . . . other good cause." Id. at 
171• Subsequent to Jones, the Oklahoma court expanded on the 
issue of what constituted "additional newly discovered evidence" 
and its rationale. The Court stated: 
We point out . . . that the Jones v. State 
. . . decision does not preclude the district 
attorney from offering for further 
consideration—a charge—which was dismissed 
at an earlier preliminary examination, when 
additional newly discovered evidence is later 
obtained; meaning, however, such evidence 
that with due diligence could have been 
available at the first preliminary 
examination. 
That decision merely requires that the 
prosecutor may not take his dismissed case— 
with the same evidence—refile it—and submit 
it to a magistrate more likely to be 
favorable. That decision requires that the 
first magistrate, who considered the 
information and evidence; and rendered a 
decision; shall consider the good cause 
offered and the new evidence, in relation to 
that upon which his earlier decision was 
premised. In short, for good cause shown, 
and subject to the presentment of new 
evidence, the charge may be refiled. 
Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. 1971) 
(emphasis added). See also, Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1973) (where discovery of prison record error after 
first preliminary hearing found to be sufficient good cause why 
evidence not acquired and introduced at the first preliminary 
hearing). 
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It is instructive also that the Utah Supreme Court, in 
adopting the Oklahoma standard in Brickey, cited with approval 
the Harper holding "that good cause to continue a preliminary 
hearing for further investigation might exist when a prosecutor 
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to 
obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly would not be 
dilatory. " Brickeyf 714 P.2d at 647 n.5. Therefore, in applying 
the Brickey standard, the State should be permitted to present 
all evidence that may have been available earlier but was not 
presented on the mistaken assumption that the evidence actually 
presented would be sufficient to establish probable cause. This 
follows from the understanding in this jurisdiction and elsewhere 
that the State often does not present all of its evidence at a 
preliminary hearing. Indeed, the State in this case went even 
further by performing extensive new tests involving the weapon at 
issue in this case and in presenting evidence after the first 
preliminary hearing that could not have been available at that 
time. 
In fact, the State still maintains that the evidence presented 
in the instant case at the first preliminary hearing was amply 
sufficient to establish the requisite probable cause 
determination. 
"The prosecution is not required to introduce its entire case 
at the hearing . . . ." State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 786 
(Utah 1980). "There is always a presumption that the State will 
strengthen its evidence at trial by production of everything 
favorable to support the charge." Matricia v. State, 726 P.2d 
900, 903 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Indeed, "the burden of putting 
on evidence at a preliminary hearing may be met entirely through 
circumstantial evidence." State v. Maynard, 596 P.2d 893, 893 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (quoting Berryhill v. State, 568 P.2d 
1306, 1310 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)). 
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In the instant case, where the State refiled the 
information before the same magistrate, the State presented more 
than enough new or previously unavailable evidence at the second 
preliminary hearing to meet the Brickey standard* A summary of 
the evidence presented at each hearing will so demonstrate. At 
the first preliminary hearing, held on July 23 and 31, 1987, the 
State presented evidence through four witnesses and five 
exhibits. 
Officer Brooke Plotnick of the West Valley Police 
Department testified that he received the dispatch call for this 
incident at 9:41 p.m. on June 15, 1987, and arrived at 
defendant's residence at 9:45 (Preliminary Hearing 1 (PHI.) 7). 
He observed Susan Quas lying on a sheet with a gunshot wound in 
her eye (PHI. 19). Officer Plotnick also spoke with and observed 
defendant. Defendant told Officer Plotnick that he had been in 
the shower, heard a bang noise, exited the shower, and found his 
wife on the living room floor (PHI. 10). However, Officer 
Plotnick, who was within two feet of defendant when he made these 
statements, testified that defendant did not appear to have 
showered because the defendant's hands and face were dirty and 
because his hair was dirty and dry in parts and not soaked as if 
it had been washed (PHI. 10-11). Finally, based upon his 
experience in responding to suicide-by-gunshot cases, Officer 
Plotnick testified that Susan Quas's death did not appear to be a 
suicide because there was an absence of blood spattering around 
the body and an absence of gunpowder on her face, and because the 
position of the body was inconsistent with suicide (PHI. 15). 
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Detective Ronald T. Edwards, a 9-year veteran of the 
West Valley Police Department, testified that he was called to 
investigate this matter and arrived at about 10:15 p.m. on June 
15, 1987, at defendant's residence (PHI. 25). He observed and 
talked with defendant within twenty-five minutes of arriving 
(PHI. 28, 51). Defendant told Detective Edwards that he had been 
arguing with his wife throughout the evening and that the 
fighting had escalated. Defendant said he told his wife that he 
was leaving for Tonopah, Nevada, that he went into the bedroom, 
took off his clothes, put on his bathrobe, and went downstairs to 
put his clothes in the washer (PHI. 34). Defendant told Edwards 
that he came back upstairs and observed his wife "dry-firing" the 
weapon and that she said she would kill herself if he left for 
Nevada. Defendant said he then went to the bathroom to take a 
shower, was in the shower for four to five minutes and heard an 
explosion. Defendant then said he ran out of the shower, 
observed his wife, picked up the gun, put it back down, and then 
made a telephone call to 911 (PHI. 35). 
In spite of defendant's representations about 
showering, Detective Edwards observed that his hands and 
fingernails were dirty (Detective Edwards noted a grease mark on 
the right hand) and that his hair was dirty and sticking out on 
the side (PHI. 32, 49-51). Detective Edwards testified that Mr. 
Quas did not appear to have showered and that he also inspected 
defendant's bathroom and shower at about 11:00 p.m. and found 
that the towels, sink, shower door, shower soap dish tray, and 
the shower itself were all dry (PHI. 36, 41-42). 
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On June 26, 1987, Detective Edwards performed a test on 
the shower at defendant's residence. He turned it on for three 
to four minutes, turned it off, and inspected it at five minute 
increments up to thirty minutes. After thirty minutes the shower 
was still wet, including the shower nozzle, handles, wall, and 
soap cup (PHI. 40-41). 
Robert W. Brinkman, a criminalist for the State of Utah 
Crime Laboratory, conducted test firings of the gun involved in 
this case. Those tests served as one basis for the expert 
testimony of Dr. Todd Grey. Mr. Brinkman also testified 
concerning the stippling or so-called "tattooing" phenomenon, 
which describes the penetration of the flesh with powder 
particles from the muzzle of the weapon (PHI. 173). He said that 
he would be surprised to find stippling unless the muzzle of the 
gun is within six to nine inches of the flesh (PHI. 175). 
Dr. Todd Grey, Assistant Medical Examiner, State of 
Utah, examined the body of Susan Quas and prepared an autopsy 
report (PHI. 109). In his training and experience as of July 
1987, Dr. Grey had viewed approximately 400 homicide cases and 
200 to 300 gunshot wound suicide cases, and he personally had 
performed examinations of 100 to 200 gunshot wound suicide 
victims and of 100 gunshot wound homicide victims. He concluded 
that the manner of death in this case was homicide (PHI. 148). 
His conclusion was based on the angle of the wound, its location 
and the pattern of stippling around the wound (PHI. 110, 143-44, 
151-52). He also testified that in his experience suicide wounds 
were almost always contact wounds or wounds inflicted within one 
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or two inches of the body (PHI. 93, 157-58). In the instant 
case, based on a comparison of the stippling on Susan Quas' face 
and test firing patterns, Dr. Grey estimated that the muzzle of 
the gun was sixteen to eighteen inches from her face (PHI. 99, 
110-11) . 
Although the foregoing was sufficient for Dr. Grey to 
reach his opinion, he mentioned as further support GSR test 
results from the State Crime Lab. This information concerned a 
GSR test that Dr. Grey performed on Susan Quas and the State 
Crime Lab analyzed. The Court sustained defendant's objection to 
7 
Dr. Grey's referring to these test results (PHI. 101-04). 
Despite the medical examiner's expert opinion that the manner of 
death was homicide, the circuit court found that the State had 
not established probable cause and granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss (PHI. 1810). 
The second preliminary hearing was held before the same 
circuit court judge in accordance with the Brickey proscription 
against judge shopping. Complying with the Brickey requirement 
that that hearing not be a de novo consideration, the State did 
not reintroduce evidence, by way of exhibits or testimony, 
submitted at the first preliminary hearing. At the second 
hearing, held on October 21, 1988, the State presented twelve new 
exhibits and five new witnesses, as well as additional testimony 
by Detective Edwards and Dr. Grey. The testimony of James 
Gaskill from the Weber State Crime Lab and Kristine Knudson, 
7 
Utah R. Evid. 703 permits an expert such as Dr. Grey to rely on 
such information and to testify about such reliances. The 
circuit court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous. 
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defendant's ex-girlfriend, most clearly met the Brickey 
standards. The State's objective, in light of the unexpected 
ruling at the first preliminary hearing, was to meet Brickey but 
o 
also to leave no doubt about probable cause. 
James Gaskill, director of the crime laboratory at 
Weber State College, testified to GSR tests he performed with the 
gun in question after the first preliminary hearing. This work 
involved many hours organizing test firings and analyzing GSR 
tests with an electro microscope. He did 25 test firings from 
the gun and took GSR tests from those who fired the gun and 
people in the vicinity. There was gunshot residue on the hands 
all 25 persons who fired the gun. No gunshot residue was found 
on the hands of the four persons tested who did not fire the gun 
(Preliminary Hearing 2 (PH2) 90-93). The GSR taken on Susan Quas 
was negative (PH2. 94). This led Mr. Gaskill to conclude that it 
was "highly unlikely" that she had fired the gun. Mr. Gaskill 
also testified that he would expect stippling from a hand gun to 
go out to a minimum of 18 inches, specifically disagreeing with 
Robert Brinkman's testimony at the first preliminary hearing that 
stippling would go out only six to nine inches from a hand gun 
(PH2. 101-02). Mr. Gaskill accordingly offered new scientific 
o 
Defendant's repeated reference to the prosecutor's statement 
about the "review issue later on" is taken completely out of 
context. This statement occurred during a calloquy between 
counsel and Judge Van Sciver and used as a reminder that the 
State wished to present the results of Mr. Gaskill's tests, as 
well as other evidence to establish probable cause and to meet 
the Brickey refiling requirement. To misinterpret a preliminary 
colloquy between counsel and the court as a basis to conclude 
Brickey was not met, is not only illogical but ignores the 
substantial new and additional evidence presented (Br. of App. at 
22). 
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evidence to support probable cause• 
Kristine Knudson, who had moved in with defendant in 
September 1987, testified to three conversations she had had with 
defendant concerning his wife's death. Each conversation 
occurred after the first preliminary hearing, and, therefore, was 
unavailable at that hearing (PH2. 75-78). Those conversations 
give three different renditions of what had occurred, and those 
stories were different than the ones defendant told to the police 
the night of Susan Quas' death (PH2. 75-78). Ms. Knudson, in a 
sense, did "jump out of the bushes" and helped meet the Brickey 
requirement. 
David Farr, forensic photographer at the Utah State 
Crime Lab, also testified to his successful photographing of the 
gun that inflicted the wound to Susan Quas on August 25, 1988 
with an electronic flash to capture an image of gas emissions 
when the gun was fired. That photograph was admitted into 
evidence (PH2. 67-73). 
Dr. Todd Grey testified that he had not changed his 
opinion from the first preliminary hearing that the manner of 
Susan Quas' death was homicide. He cited the original evidence 
that he had used and the additional evidence of the negative GSR 
test, the results of Mr. Gaskill's tests and the photograph of 
the test firing of the gun (PH2. 122-29). Dr. Grey's opinion, 
therefore, was supported by new evidence. 
Detective Edwards, who had testified at the first 
preliminary hearing, elaborated on his prior testimony and 
testified concerning new evidence. He testified that he had 
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looked at the only hot water heater in the basement of 
defendant's residence and discovered that the water had been shut 
off and the pilot light was out (PH2. 30-33). He also testified 
that he had recovered items being washed in the washing machine 
at the time of his arrival at defendant's residence and that 7 of 
the 13 items in the washing machine were towels, in contrast to 
defendant's statement that he had been washing clothes for an 
imminent trip to Tonopah, Nevada (PH2. 34-35). He testified that 
there was no blood spattering on Susan Quas' hand or arm, which 
surprised him and which he expected to see in the event of a 
suicide, but that he did find fresh blood on the carpet runner in 
the main hallway of the house and down into the basement (PH2. 
35-39). That blood was analyzed later and determined to be type 
A, the same type as Susan Quas' blood (PH2. 100-101). After 
administering a GSR to defendant, at which time defendant stated 
that he had fertilized the lawn that day (implying that any 
9 
residue on his hands would have come from fertilizer), 
Detective Edwards checked defendant's garage and found three bags 
of fertilizer. One was unopened and one buried under debris. A 
quarter bag was inside the fertilizer spreader, but the spreader 
was rusted and appeared not to have been used within several 
months. The remainder of that bag was caked from moisture, and 
no empty fertilizer bags were in the garbage (PH2. 39-40). 
Detective Edwards readministered a water test on the shower on 
A prior GSR test, no longer in use at the time of Susan Quas' 
death, would have tested false positive for the nitrites and 
nitrates found in fertilizer. Unbeknownst to defendant, the test 
now used would not show positive results for those chemicals. 
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August 20, 1988. He turned the shower on for two to three 
minutes, turned it off and returned approximately one hour and 35 
minutes later. At that time he found water in the seal, the soap 
dish and between the two glass doors (PH2. 41-42). Detective 
Edwards also testified concerning the gunfiring test he performed 
that day to ascertain whether Pam Young, defendant's neighbor, 
could have heard a gunshot from defendant's residence as well as 
photograph tests made with the gun at the Utah State Crime Lab 
(PH2. 42-48). 
Pam Young, defendant's next door neighbor, testified 
that she had been at home during the early evening of June 15, 
1987 and had gone for a walk around the neighborhood with a 
friend between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00-9:05 p.m. At 9:05 she walked 
by defendant's residence and saw defendant inside without a shirt 
on, doing something in the living room (PH2. 7-10). She then sat 
on her front porch until the police arrived fifteen to twenty 
minutes later. During that time she had heard no sounds, no 
shouting and no gunshot (PH2. 11). When Detective Edwards 
visited her in August 1988 and had the gun that shot defendant's 
wife fired in defendant's residence, without telling Ms. Young 
that it would be fired, she clearly heard the shot (PH2. 12). 
Sergeant Russell E. Spann of the West Valley City 
Police testified that he arrived at defendant's residence at 9:48 
p.m. on June 15, 1987 and talked with defendant within three to 
five minutes after his arrival (PH2. 17-18). Defendant had 
stated that he had been in the shower when he heard a shot, came 
out and called 911. Sgt. Spann testified that although 
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defendant's hair was damp, it was not soaked and defendant's 
hands were extremely dirty (PH2. 19-20). Sgt. Spann also noticed 
that the plastic carpet runner going down the hallway to the 
bathroom was dry and that the bathroom floor, shower, bath tub 
and side walls also were dry. He made his inspection within 15 
minutes of his arrival (PH2. 20). 
The evidence submitted by the State at the second 
preliminary hearing, especially the evidence from Mr. Gaskill, 
Ms. Knudson and Dr. Grey, clearly satisfied the Brickey standard 
of producing "new or previously unavailable" evidence. Moreover, 
the evidence was sufficient to meet the probable cause 
requirements for binding over defendant to stand trial because it 
established a "prima face case" from which a jury "could conclude 
the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged." Anderson, 
612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980). The circuit court's finding that 
the State met the Brickey requirement and established probable 
cause was correct (PH2. 152). 
POINT IV 
THE TESTIMONIES OF DR. TODD GREY AND BRENT 
MARCHANT WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED AND DID NOT 
VIOLATE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 702, 404 AND 
403. 
Defendant argues that 702, 404 and 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence were violated by the admission of the testimonies of Dr. 
Todd Grey, Assistant State Medical Examiner at the time of his 
investigation in this case, and Brent Marchant, a Contract 
Investigator for the State Medical Examiner's Office. No 
contemporaneous objection to their testimonies was made at trial, 
and, therefore, defendant has waived his right to raise the 
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matter on appeal. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). Defendant mentions, without 
explanation or analysis, that this Court should evaluate his 
position because the trial court committed "plain error" in 
allowing in the questioned testimonies (Br. of App. at 33 n.31.) 
There is no need to reach a plain error analysis, so 
the State will address it only briefly here. Rule 103(d), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, provides: "Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting rule 103(d), has 
established a two-part test to determine a finding of plain 
error. First, the error must be "plain," that is, from 
examination of the record it should be obvious that the trial 
court was committing error. Second, the error must have affected 
the substantial rights of the accused, that is, the error must 
have been harmful. Eldredge, 77 3 P.2d at 35. 
Defendant's reliance on rules 702, 404 and 403 to 
support a "plain error" finding is misplaced. Rule 702, which 
governs the admission of expert testimony, reads as follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of opinion or 
otherwise. 
Extensive foundation was laid for the testimonies by Dr. Grey and 
Mr. Marchant (T. 651-53, 475-78). Each spoke from his own 
experience in investigations of gunshot homicides and suicides. 
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Based on his experience and review of evidence in the instant 
case, Dr. Grey concluded, based on a variety of factors, that the 
manner of Susan Quas' death was homicide (T. 688, 90). Mr. 
Marchant did not even express an opinion as to the manner of 
Susan Quas' death. He testified only that he considered her 
wounds unusual and that he had seen only one instance of suicide 
in which the victim was shot in the eye (T. 479-82). Both 
witnesses' testimonies were properly admitted under rule 702 
requirements and they were both clearly entitled to rely on their 
experiences under rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant erroneously states that the prosecutor represented 
to the jurors that the experts had reached professional opinions 
on defendant's guilt and that this violated defendant's right to 
a jury trial (Br. of App. at 38[2]). In so stating, defendant 
quoted from the State's closing argument out of context. The 
pertinent exerpt follows: 
There were Mr. Gaskill's opinion that it 
was highly unlikely that Susan fired the gun, 
the opinion of an experienced criminalist; 
Dr. Grey's opinion that the manner of death 
was homicide, the opinions of an experienced 
pathologist who's examined hundreds of 
gunshot suicides and homicides and whose job 
it is — this is his job to determine — the 
manner of death; an opinion he holds without 
a doubt; an opinion he holds with as much as 
or more certainty than you need to have. And 
a combination of opinions from a leading 
criminalist and the State's medical examiner, 
that Susan Quas did not fire the weapon. 
(T. 945-46) (emphasis added). 
(Br. of App. at 35.[2]) Defendant misrepresents the argument. 
The argument is strictly limited to Dr. Grey's determination on 
the manner of death. It makes no comment on and no inference 
concerning who caused the death or on guilt. It was a fair 
comment on the evidence presented. Dr. Grey testified that he 
held his opinion on manner of death without a doubt (T. 690). 
Note also that defense counsel did not object to any of the 
State's closing argument nor even responded to this statement in 
closing argument for the defendant. 
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Defendant's rule 404 objection is also flawed. That 
rule governs the limited instances when admission of character 
evidence of an accused, a victim or a witness is proper. Without 
explanation or reference to the transcript, defendant alleges 
that the "prosecution was allowed to inform the jurors that Susan 
Quas's conduct on the night of her death could be deduced from 
the character, or traditional past conduct, of other people." 
(Br. of App. at 38. [1]) The prosecutor made no such argument, 
and, even if he had, rule 404 cannot be applied to address 
character evidence concerning persons other than those specified 
in the rule. 
Finally, defendant states that rule 403 was violated in 
allowing jurors to be distracted from their duty in the instant 
case with evidence of other cases (Br. of App. at 38). Rule 403 
allows the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
12 prejudice, confusion or waste of time. No evidence of other 
Defendant may be implying that the expert testimony relating 
to the manner of Susan Quas' death is character evidence. If so, 
defendant only demonstrates a lack of understanding of different 
categories of evidence and rules 702 and 404. 
12 
Defendant seems to rely on State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 
1986), to support this assertion as well as his assertions 
concerning rule 702. However, defendant offers no analysis or 
explanation of his reliance on that case. In Rammel the trial 
court permitted a police officer to testify, as an expert, that 
it was not unusual for a criminal suspect to lie because in his 
experience no criminal suspect has admitted "right off the bat" 
to committing a crime. Jd. at 500. The Utah Supreme Court found 
the trial court's ruling erroneous because expert foundation was 
lacking for such an opinion and, even if relevant as impeachment 
evidence, its potential for prejudice substantially outweighed 
its probative value. Id. at 501. Defendant may be attempting to 
equate the unfounded non-expert testimony in Rammel to the well-
founded expert testimony here. If so, the equation is 
unsupported and unsupportable. 
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cases was presented, and the expert testimony complained of by 
defendant here was neither unfairly prejudicial, confusing or a 
waste of time. Application of rule 403 is not warranted, 
especially in light of the strong basis in rule 703 to admit such 
evidence. Indeed, rule 703 is plainly dispositive on this issue. 
The testimonies of Dr. Grey and Mr. Marchant were well-
founded, and the witnesses spoke from their personal observation 
of physical evidence, their experiences and expertise. There was 
no error. Moreover, defendant's "plain error" assertion is 
meritless; he has not satisfied either the obviousness or the 
prejudice prongs of the plain error test set forth in Eldredge. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS THAT 
DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY WHEN THE 
STATEMENTS WERE MADE. 
On May 16, 1987, defendant filed a motion to suppress: 
any and all statements by the defendant, and 
fruits of any such statements, made in 
violation of the defendant's rights under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution, and Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Grounds for this motion are that the 
defendant invoked his right to have an 
attorney present during questioning by 
Detective Ron Edwards on June 15, 1987, [sic] 
but Detective Edwards continued to question 
the defendant nonetheless. 
(R. 412). 
Although the motion itself is broadly worded, the 
grounds asserted for the motion specify only the statements made 
to Detective Edwards. At the hearing on the motion to suppress 
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of May 22, 1989, evidence and argument were limited to statements 
made by defendant at the West Valley Police Department during an 
interview with Detective Edwards between 1:20 a.m. and 1:45 a.m. 
on June 16, 1987. Defendant was arrested at approximately 6:15-
6:30 a.m. that morning, four and one-half hours after his 
interview (S.H. 73). 
Following presentation of evidence and arguments, the 
trial court made the following factual findings: 
While the West Valley Police were at the home 
of defendant (the purported scene of the 
crime), defendant indicated he wanted to 
leave. It would appear, though the record is 
very unclear, that Officer Lamont Cox asked 
defendant if he wanted to go to the West 
Valley Police Station, and defendant 
responded in the affirmative. Thereafter, 
apparently Officer Cox transported defendant 
to the station where he remained for 
approximately 2 hours, free to do as he 
liked, and without any restraint or activity 
of any kind. No one advised defendant he was 
being arrested, and there is nothing in the 
record to indicate there was even an 
appearance of arrest. 
About two hours later, Officer Ron 
Edwards, who had been at defendant's home all 
the time that defendant was at the station, 
arrived at the station. He arrived shortly 
after 1:00 a.m., June 16, 1988 [sic], and 
found Quas in the line-up room. No one had 
interviewed the defendant at the station 
prior to that time. He asked defendant Quas 
if he had someone who could pick him up. 
Quas replied MRuss Wagner." Officer Edwards 
told him he could use the phone to call 
Wagner about picking him up. He also told 
Quas he was not under arrest, and that he was 
free to leave. Following that, Officer 
Edwards took the recorded statement received 
herein as EX D-l. It appears to the Court 
that the interview took approximately 30 
minutes. 
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(R. 446-47). Based on those factual findings the trial court 
concluded that there had been no custodial interrogation and 
denied defendant's motion. 
On appeal defendant alleges the trial court erroneously 
denied his motion to supress. He also argues that all statements 
made by defendant at his home to police officers prior to the 
recorded West Valley Police Department interview with Detective 
Edwards should also be suppressed. However, no contemporaneous 
objection to their admission was made at trial, and those 
statements played no part in the pre-trial suppression hearing. 
Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, requires that "a clear and 
definite objection" be made at trial to preserve an evidentiary 
error for appeal. State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 24, 34-35 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). Thus, defendant waived his 
right to challenge the admission of those statements. Even if 
this Court should determine that the matter of the prior 
statements is properly before it at this stage of the 
proceedings, the issue of their admissibility would be subsumed 
under the trial court's ruling since the indices of "custody" 
would have been even less at defendant's own residence earlier in 
the evening than at the police station. The trial record so 
13 
reflects. 
At the suppression hearing, Detective Edwards testified that 
when defendant requested to leave his residence, Detective 
Edwards instructed Officer Lamont Cox to ask defendant if he 
wanted to go to the "P.D. or somewhere" (SH. 60). Defendant 
chose to go to the police department but he was free to stay or 
go elsewhere. 
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In reviewing the trial court's evidentiary ruling, this 
Court applies the following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous . . 
. . The trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
'correction of error' standard, . . . 
Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App., cert, granted, 108 
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah May 4, 1989) (citations omitted); see 
also State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985); State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987) (which suggest that the "clearly 
erroneous" standard applies to the trial court's factual 
evaluation and its legal conclusion). 
The issue before the trial court at the suppression 
hearing was whether defendant was subject to a "custodial 
14 interrogation" by Detective Edwards. In Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court stated 
that "by custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." The "relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man 
in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). 
This issue is not waiver, as defendant suggests, but custody. 
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The leading decision concerning the nature of "custody" 
is Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). In that case, a 
police officer asked the defendant to meet at a state patrol 
office. Upon defendant's arrival, the officer took the defendant 
into a room, told him that he was not under arrest, closed the 
door, informed the defendant that he was a suspect in a burglary 
and falsely told defendant that his fingerprints had been found 
at the burglary scene. Thereafter, defendant confessed to the 
burglary. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld defendant's 
conviction, which was based in part on the confession, because 
there was "no indication that the questioning took place in a 
context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted in 
any way." Td. The Court found the false statement about 
fingerprints irrelevant to the custody question. jEd. at 495-96. 
Captivity is the necessary ingredient and predicate to the 
compulsion protected by the fifth amendment. 
The "noncustodial situation" in Mathiason was "not 
converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a 
reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal 
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took 
place in a 'coercive environment.'" _Id. at 495. Miranda 
warnings are not required "simply because the questioning takes 
place in the station house, or because the questioned person is 
one who is the police suspect." Ld. See also California v. 
Behler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (where Miranda warnings were 
not required when a suspect voluntarily came to a police station, 
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the Court stated "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is 
a 'formal arrest or restraint in freedom of movement' of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest, . . . ." (citations 
omitted)). 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v. 
Shuman, 639 P.2d 155 (Utah 1981), ruling that M[w]hen defendant 
willingly accompanied the deputy to the sheriff's office and 
while he remained there to speak with the sheriff and the 
psychologist, he was not in custody because he had not been 
placed under arrest or given any indication that he would have 
been compelled to go if he had resisted or been restrained from 
leaving if he had desired." Id., at 157. 
Following Shuman, the court elaborated on factors it 
considered when 
determining whether an accused who has not 
been formally arrested is in custody. They 
are: (1) the site of interrogation; (2) 
whether the investigation focused on the 
accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of 
arrest were present; and (4) the length and 
form of interrogation. . . . 
Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) 
(emphasis added). The Court referred to "indicia of arrest" as 
"readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." Ld. It also 
made it clear that "an investigation cannot become accusatory 
until there is a likelihood that a crime has been committed." 
Id. In light of Carner, it is important to note that here 
defendant was accused of nothing at the time of his interview 
with Detective Edwards and that at that time it had not been 
ascertained yet that a crime had been committed. Police still 
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Edwards: Where does he live at. 
Quas: I would have to call him on the 
phone. 
Edwards: What is his phone number. 
Quas: Well see I have it written down in 
the little brown book I have at 
home. I would let you guys know 
anything that you want to know. 
Edwards: Well, the thing it is you can call 
him from here and have him come 
pick you up. 
(T. 9-10). Detective Edwards also testified that before the 
taped interview he had asked defendant if he wanted someone to 
come and pick him up at the police department. Defendant had 
said yes, Russell Wagner, who lived in Kearns and whose number 
defendant did not know. Detective Edwards looked up the number, 
wrote it on a piece of paper and gave it to defendant (SH. 70). 
At the same hearing Detective Edwards testified that 
some time after the police arrived at defendant's residence, 
defendant told Officer Lamont Cox that he wanted to leave his 
residence. When Officer Cox relayed the request to Detective 
Edwards he was told to ask the defendant if he wanted to go to 
the "P.D. or somewhere." Subsequently, defendant got dressed and 
was taken by the police to the West Valley Police Station (S.H. 
68). Detective Edwards stated that he imagined defendant would 
have been free to leave his residence if he had so desired but 
that the matter had not even crossed anyone's minds at that point 
(S.H. 69). He also stated that defendant was not under arrest at 
the time of the interview at the police station, that he had been 
told so and was free to leave afterwards (S.H. 71). Detective 
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traditionally wiJl not consider it on appeal. State v. Johnscr , 
771 P.2d at 328. Defendant cites the dicta in State v. Crank, 
142 , T-.J 1~8 (Utah !^"3) as supporting an article 1, section 12 
analysis of rr^i involved in the presentation of custodial 
statements r: , w£ App. at 42 », As c .'ted Crank is concerned 
solely with t 10 competency of a confess,^n. Here defendant did 
not confess and there was no issue of v< ;untariness. Thi^, 
application of Crank t«. the present las^ . - ' fplc' 
Detective ^awards testitieo .irec examinatit in;' at the 
police station defendant statec i _>it he was half shaved and in 
the shower when he heard the gunshot (T. 378). That testimony 
was merely cumulative and corroborative of statements defendant 
had made to Detective Edwards and other police officers wh: !e i + 
his residence. Its i nclusi on i s pla •"••• ^ r ^ e s s , 
has ruled that statements taken in violation of Miranda rules are 
admissible to impeach conflicting testimony of a defendant. 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 
714 (1975). This position was followed by this Court in State v. 
Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. 
Kish, 28 Utah 2d 430, 503 P.2d 1208 (1972). As applied to the 
instant case, the use of defendant's statements for impeachment 
17 purposes was permissible. 
Finally, even if the trial court erred in failing to 
suppress defendant's statements, more than enough other evidence, 
much of which defendant fails to mention in his summary of facts 
in his brief, was admitted to sustain defendant's conviction, and 
the error would be harmless. In light of the compelling expert 
testimony, the physical evidence and defendant's numerous 
inconsistent statements to the 911 operator, Kris Knudson, 
Sherrie Meyer, the poice officer who first arrived on the scene, 
and others, no reasonable likelihood exists that without the 
statements there would have been a different result. See State 
v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. 
Even though defendant asserts a sixth amendment violation in 
the present case, no sixth amendment right could have attached at 
the time in question since no formal proceeding had begun. Even 
if a sixth amendment right had attached, in Michigan v. Harvey, 
110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990), the United States Supreme Court recently 
ruled that a statement taken in violation of the Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) prophylactic rule (that once a 
criminal defendant invokes his sixth amendment right to counsel, 
a subsequent waiver of that right—even if voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent under traditional standards—is presumed invalid if 
secured pursuant to police-initiated conversation), may be used 
by the prosecution to impeach a defendant's false or inconsistent 
testimony. Ld. at 4288. 
-38-
H u t c h i n s . i . , r - - « o^ ;
 J t a h 
K • UJTJLITi • r • *s \, \ *^* j 
POINT VI 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING SUSAN QUAS S STATfc ^  >" 
MIND PRIOR TO HER DEATH WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
V , t- , . . J V *J * i- - - _- .* 
4
 * - • inyone; and parti^uiax^y 
pe 11 :c . ii.vti *oserv Wr i c» *' • r •- m 
testify.ng concerning certain statemei - ' - =n 
i-j^tv nose statements v^eie :-. . ne 
eftect LLai i - -r * defendant 
W O U J " have been tr.e iP'iner^ . ii4r li, : * .-. 
* t'^ iT'^ nt-c w. „ i c \o* in* jno- \r*e ifc 
Evi - ^ t:XLL-t, * ' "cir,Y,fs t*-c;t n y 
c o n c e r r i n - * - d e c l a r a n t ' s t h e : e x i r c j . j ^ L Q U - . . . 
•^ e ^ i d ^ n c e would be h i g h i \ 
p r e j u d i c i a l , presumaLJ.y t \ . , .s . . E y i d • 
« i "4 i 
Tne , r:r - • ' *, ' ' *• counsel ^n ":h^ 
issue which i1 i.iJt..i.i»i ^ , ^ „ , iidit - . ^u. . - ?i 
9 ~ *"f -*i!~ \ * - : State v. Wauneka, c* r 1 \: (ute:. ) 
wci tr auaiefci^ • . >«- denied 
defendant ,- irotjun , - i. *,. „ • _u 
c " --•r-1.r*r1- - .* -oncerning - ts;,mony 
i *, :; itrSL*-. . - f->*
 t r_.pose of 
assessing t ».- j ; >11 > J : :M ui SusdL ^ 
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demonstrate ;.. ,i^t.^^\ J s ruling In those 
cases the Utah Supreme Court held that statements of a homicide 
victim who reported threats of death or serious bodily injury by 
the defendant in a case, under certain circumstances, could be 
admitted under the state of mind exception of Utah R. Evid. 
803(3). To do so the statements could not be used to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted and had to meet the following other 
criteria: 
(i) the evidence [must be] probative of 
the decedent's state of mind at the time of 
the killing, and (ii) the decedent's state of 
mind . . . [must have] already been placed in 
issue by defense evidence or argument that 
the killing was (a) suicide, (b) in self-
defense, or (c) an accident to which the 
decedent contributed by acting as an 
aggressor. 
State v. Auble, 754 P.2d at 937 (citing State v. Wauneka, 560 
P.2d at 1380). In addition, because of "that great potential for 
unfair prejudice," such evidence should be admitted "only when it 
is directly relevant to a material issue raised by the defense." 
Id. Finally, the Court considered a limiting instruction 
concerning the use of such evidence a "per se requirement." Id. 
In the instant case, each of the Auble-Wauneka 
prerequisites was present. First, the evidence was not only 
probative of the decedent's state of mind, it spoke directly to 
it and contradicted notions that she was suicidal. Second, the 
state of mind had already been raised by defendant in defense 
counsel's opening argument and before the defense moved to 
exclude fact statements. In opening argument, the defense 
counsel stated that the case was one of suicide, that the jury 
would have "uncontroverted evidence concerning the state of mind 
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In light of the trial court's compliance with Auble and 
Wauneka, the evidence in question was properly admitted at trial. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED "FLIGHT" JURY INSTRUCTION AND 
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Rejected Defendant's 
proposed "Flight" Jury Instruction. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing 
to give the following "flight" instruction, as requested by 
defendant: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person 
immediately after the commission of a crime 
or after he is accused of a crime that has 
been commited [sic], is not sufficient in 
itself to establish his guilt; but such 
flight, if proved, may be considered by you 
in light of all other proven facts in the 
case in determining guilt or innocense [sic]. 
On the other hand, the fact that a person did 
not flee after the occurrence of an incident, 
if proved, may also be considered by you in 
light of all other proven facts in the case 
in determining guilt or innocense [sic]. 
Consciousness of guilt may be inferred 
from flight, however, it does not necessarily 
reflect actual guilt of the crime charged, 
and there may be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocense [sic]. On the 
other hand, lack of consciousness of guilt 
may be inferred from the fact that a person 
did not flee; however, it does not 
necessarily reflect actual innocense [sic] of 
the crime charged, and there may be reasons 
for lack of flight fully consistent with 
guilt. Therefore, whether or not evidence of 
flight or lack of flight shows a 
consciousness of guilt or lack of 
consciousness of guilt and the significance, 
if any, to be attached to any such evidence 
are matters exclusively within the province 
of the jury. 
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defendant was not entitled to an instruction which was merely 
redundant or repetitive of the court's instructions. State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. 
McCumber, 672 P.2d 353, 354 (Utah 1980)). In addition, "no 
prejudicial error occurs if it appears that the giving of the 
requested instruction would not have affected the outcome of the 
trial." State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d at 359; see also State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146. In the instant case it is 
inconceivable that the absence of the proposed instruction would 
have in any way affected the trial's outcome. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury 
as to What Constitutes a Reasonable Doubt. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed error 
in denying defendant's motion to strike the jury panel. That 
motion was made on the basis of statements made by the trial 
court during voir dire. On the first day of trial, in the 
preliminary stages of voir dire, the trial court spoke to all 
prospective jurors concerning legal standards to be applied by 
them. Included in the trial court's discussion of reasonable 
doubt were the following sentences: 
A reasonable doubt is not one that is 
merely possible, fanciful or imaginary, 
because most everything relating to human 
affairs is open to some possible doubt. . . . 
But if after such impartial consideration 
and comparison of all the evidence you can 
truthfully say that you have an abiding 
conviction of the Defendant's guilt such as 
you'd be willing to act upon in the more 
weighty and important matters relating to 
your own affairs, you have no reasonable 
doubt. 
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Accordingly, the judge may, over the 
objection of the defendant's counsel, give 
any instruction that is in proper form, 
states the law correctly, and does not 
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113 
Ariz- 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976). 
However, all instructions are subject to the 
general and overreaching rule that the judge 
must make it clear to the jury that the 
defendant has "no particular burden of proof 
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there 
[is] any basis in the evidence from either 
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant [is] guilty of the 
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 
(Utah 1980) . . . . 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). 
Here, the trial court fully and correctly instructed 
that defendant was entitled to a presumption of innocence 
(Instructions 7; R. 574), that the State carried the burden of 
proving all essential elements of the crime (Instructions 7 and 
12; R. 574, 579) and that the State must prove that defendant 
acted with the requisite intent (Instructions 12-18; R. 579-85). 
The trial court gave the following reasonable doubt 
instruction: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence. A 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
The burden is on the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
require proof to an absolute certainty. A 
reasonable doubt is based on reason and 
common sense and not on speculation or 
imagination. It is a doubt that is 
reasonable in view of all of the evidence. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy 
the mind and convince those who are bound to 
act conscientiously upon such proof. A 
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the evidence, A reasonable doubt is a doubt 
which reasonable men and women would 
entertain, and it must arise from the 
evidence or the lack of evidence in this 
case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case, 
you can candidly say that you have the kind 
of doubt which would cause a person to 
hesitate to act, you have a reasonable doubt. 
Deciding that someone has committed a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different 
from making decisions concerning the more 
weighty affairs of life. In such affairs of 
life, a person looks forward and, based on a 
degree of hope, determination and personal 
resolve, makes a decision that involves a 
degree of risk. However, this decision is 
revocable or at least salvageable. 
A decision to convict or not looks 
backward. It is always irrevocable as to 
your decision. It demands reason, 
impartiality and common sense. You must have 
a greater assurance of correctness of this 
decision than you normally have in making the 
weighty decision in your life. 
In so rejecting, the court noted the following: 
Requested by defendant, but not given by 
the Court (instruction #7 given). The 
reference to "more some potential for 
misleading the jury as to what" "reasonable 
doubt" is, the "irrevocable" reference might 
mislead the jury to the conclusion that the 
defendant is without any remedies, such as 
new trial, appeal, parole, etc., and make 
[sic] suggest something absent the severity 
of the penalty, without regard to the options 
available to the sentencing judge. 
(R. 596). 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
rejecting defendant's proposed instruction, which clearly was an 
attempt to exploit the Johnson and Ireland authority in an 
overreaching manner, and in giving the cited instructions. That, 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1989). 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any 
court of record involving a charge of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
Utah R. Evid. 702 (Supp. 1989): 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 (Supp. 1989): 
The facts or data in the particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearing. If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
